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MULTILINGUAL LAW AND JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION IN THE EU*
 
Tamara Δapeta**
Summary: The purpose of this article is to assess how multilingualism 
affects judicial interpretation of EU law. In the EU, the European Court 
of Justice is in the position of having the ﬁ nal say on what EU norms 
mean. Therefore, the article looks into the case law of that Court. It is 
well known that all ofﬁ cial EU languages (23 of them at present) are 
authentic languages. Less known is what the related consequences 
are for interpretation in judicial proceedings. The ﬁ rst aim of the ar-
ticle is to ﬁ nd out what consequences the ECJ has drawn from this 
fact. Secondly, even though in some cases (eg CILFIT) the ECJ has 
postulated language comparison as a necessary step in construing 
the meaning of EU law, it is clear that such comparisons are not per-
formed on a regular basis. Therefore, the article looks into when, on 
whose initiative, and for what purpose the Court performs a compari-
son of the same EU norm(s) expressed in different languages. The 
article then looks into what the Court does if discrepancies in different 
language versions are found, and concludes that such a problem is 
overcome by looking for the purpose of a legal norm. Finally, it is found 
that multilingualism does not signiﬁ cantly affect the manner and out-
come of interpretation by the ECJ.  
1. Introduction - on judicial interpretation
This article considers judicial interpretation, understood as the way 
in which the courts establish the meaning of legal rules. The use of the 
word ‘establish’ rather than ‘ﬁ nd’ is intentional in my description of what 
judicial interpretation is. It suggests that the meaning of legal rules is not 
given, but rather depends both on the context and the interpreter.1 
This article takes as given that law, even if expressed in a single 
language, always requires interpretation before it is applied. This is so 
because, if for nothing else, law is, in the great majority of cases, ex-
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pressed in words. If words were simple carriers of a single meaning, then 
interpretation would not be an issue. Interpreting law would simply mean 
looking into dictionaries to ﬁ nd the single meaning of each word in the 
phrase, and we would have the legal truth. There are theories, such as 
the strong language theory, which believe in the objectivity of words, and 
therefore also of legal rules.2 In contrast to this view, there are those who 
start from a different premise, according to which words do not have a 
single determinate meaning, either in everyday life or in legal rules.3 Just 
as in everyday life, the meaning of words in law depends on the context 
and the interpreter. This makes the job of judicial interpretation a com-
plex exercise. 
One big difference, though, between the words in everyday life and 
the words in legal norms is that legal norms do have a ﬁ nal interpreter 
of their meaning. Due to their institutional position in the legal systems, 
courts, or at least the highest courts, are in a position to determine the 
meaning of the words of a legal norm with binding authority, which no 
one can shake without changing the norm itself. This places a great deal 
of power in the hands of the courts. At the same time, given the indeter-
minacy of meaning, it is difﬁ cult to understand and, therefore, to control 
the process in the courts when they interpret legal rules. As stated by 
Brown and Kennedy in a description of the process of judicial interpreta-
tion in the European Court of Justice, ‘interpretation of law is in no way 
an exact science but rather a judicial art. In the end, it is a matter of ju-
dicial instinct, and because the judge proceeds instinctively, the process 
cannot be reduced to a series of mechanical rules’.4 
All this makes the topic of judicial interpretation an important and 
fascinating topic. There are many questions linked to the issue of judicial 
interpretation: what do the courts do when interpreting the law, what in-
forms their ﬁ nal construction of meaning, what should inform their ﬁ nal 
construction of meaning, are there any boundaries to the judicial con-
struction of law, and, if so, where are these boundaries, how is judicial 
interpretation legitimised in a democratic society? There are also many 
other such questions. However, as law is expressed in words, words are 
the very beginning of every judicial interpretation, and therefore an in-
vestigation into the topic of judicial interpretation must start from the 
signiﬁ cance of words in this process.
2  Engberg (n 1) 1140.
3  M Rosenfeld, ‘Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conﬂ ict, Indeterminacy and the 
Temptations of the New Legal Formalism’ in D Cornell, M Rosenfeld and D G Carlson (eds), 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge, New York & London 1992).
4  LN Brown and T Kennedy, Brown&Jacobs: The Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 323.
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Unlike most legal systems, the law of the European Union is written 
in many languages. At the moment, with 27 Member States, there are 23 
ofﬁ cial EU languages. The question raised in this paper is how does the 
fact that the words in EU law are expressed in many languages affect, if 
at all, the judicial interpretation of that law? 
In the European Union, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is in 
the position of ﬁ nal interpreter of the meaning of European legal norms. 
Even if this is not stated expressly anywhere in the Treaties, the ECJ has 
acquired the authority of ﬁ nal interpreter of EU law due to its role in the 
preliminary ruling procedure, as regulated in Article 234 TEC.5 In other 
words, it is this Court which construes the meaning of the words con-
tained in EU legal norms with binding authority. This does not mean that 
others - citizens, businesses, other EU institutions, national institutions, 
including national courts - do not interpret EU law. They do so daily, as 
they cannot apply it without interpretation. However, their construction 
of the meaning of EU norms is valid only as long as someone else does 
not bring it into question. Contrary constructions of meaning attributed 
to the same EU legal norm can ﬁ nally be resolved only by the ECJ.
This article, therefore, looks into the case law of the ECJ to answer 
the question how multilingualism inﬂ uences the interpretation of EU 
law. It analyses the cases in which the Court undertook a comparison of 
different language versions, and considers how the conclusion that they 
differed or did not differ inﬂ uenced the outcome - the ﬁ nal meaning given 
to the terms. 
2. The starting point - all EU languages are authentic 
According to Article 33 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and 
Article 314 of the Treaty on the European Community (TEC), all languag-
es in which the Treaties are written are original languages. 
Of course, in reality, the text of the Treaties was not negotiated and 
written in all these languages, but at most in the languages of the States 
that were members of the EC/EU at the time of the adoption of the rel-
evant text. Languages of the new Member States are made original lan-
guages by legal ﬁ ction. Technically, this is done through the Accession 
Treaties, which add new languages to the lists enumerated in the Found-
ing Treaties. In the last two waves of enlargement, this was done through 
Article 61/2 of the Act of Accession (2003), which added 10 new languag-
5  T Δapeta, Sudovi Europske unije - nacionalni sudovi kao europski sudovi (IMO, Zagreb 
2002) 179-296.
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es,6 and Article 60/2 of the Protocol on Conditions for Admission (2005), 
which added Bulgarian and Romanian.7 
Secondary law of the EC/EU is also authentic in the languages of all 
Member States. This is stated in Article 4 of Regulation No 1 which deter-
mines the languages to be used by the European Economic Community, 
as amended by all Acts of Accession. Article 58 of the Act of Accession of 
ten states, signed in 2003, is an example of how new languages are added 
as authentic: 
The texts of the acts of the institutions, and of the European Central 
Bank, adopted before accession and drawn up by the Council, the 
Commission or the European Central Bank in the Czech, Estonian, 
Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak and Slove-
nian languages shall, from the date of accession, be authentic under 
the same conditions as the texts drawn up in the present eleven lan-
guages. They shall be published in the Ofﬁ cial Journal of the Euro-
pean Union if the texts in the present languages were so published. 
Thus, the law of the European Union is, at present, authentic in 23 
ofﬁ cial languages in its 27 Member States. What does that mean for the 
European Court of Justice when interpreting legal norms belonging to 
this legal order?
Firstly, the fact that law is expressed in 23 different ways does not 
mean that it may have 23 different meanings. The EU legal norms are 
norms common to all Member States and in all of them they need to have 
the same consequences. Thus (even if this probably does not need a sepa-
rate statement), in its interpretive effort, the ECJ has the task of ﬁ nding 
one single meaning for all 23 linguistic versions of EU legal norms. In a 
way, especially if there are semantic differences between different lan-
guage versions, the Court’s task is to ‘transcend the written text’8 or, in 
the EU context, the written texts. 
Secondly, as wittily noticed by the Advocate General Lagrange, the 
statement that all languages are authentic means that no single one of 
them is authentic.9 This consequently means that in establishing uni-
6  Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Esto-
nia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic 
of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded [2003] OJ L236/33 of 23 September 2003.
7  Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union [2005] OJ L157/29 of 21 June 2005.
8  T Klimas and J Vaiciukaite, ‘Interpretation of European Union Multilingual Law’ (2005) 3 
International Journal of Baltic Law 1, 10.
9  Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange in Case 13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus 
en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der 
Firma Willem van Rijn [1962] ECR 47, 70.
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form meaning, no language may be given preference in relation to any 
other language, notwithstanding the size of the State or the number of 
people in Europe who understand that language. The practice of the ECJ 
has conﬁ rmed this position. 
One example is case C-296/95 EMU Tabac and Others.10 It concerned 
the interpretation of Council Directive 92/12/EEC related to excise du-
ties.11 The question was whether a person who bought cigarettes in Lux-
embourg and imported them through an agent into the UK for private 
consumption should pay UK excise duties (which were higher) or excise 
duties under Luxembourg regulations (which were lower). The Directive 
provided that if goods were for private consumption, only the excise du-
ties of the state of purchase were payable. However, this was conditioned 
by the requirement that goods were bought and transported by the per-
son who needed them for private consumption. The question arose about 
whether this could be done through an agent. The applicants, who were 
the person who bought the cigarettes and the companies involved in the 
scheme, enumerated several language versions of the Directive - English, 
French, Italian, Spanish, German, Dutch and Portuguese - claiming that 
they did not exclude the possibility of buying and transporting goods 
through an agent.12 The Court  found that two language versions - Dan-
ish and Greek - used wording which clearly required that transportation 
be effected personally by the purchaser of the products subject to duty in 
order for the duty to be payable in the country of purchase.13 Since this 
was not in their favour, the applicants claimed that if
those versions are not consistent with the other versions they are 
to be disregarded, on the ground that, at the time when the Direc-
tive was adopted, those two Member States represented in total only 
5% of the population of the 12 Member States and their languag-
es are not easily understood by the nationals of the other Member 
States.14 
The Court rejected such arguments, stating, among other things: 
[…] all the language versions must, in principle, be recognised as 
having the same weight and this cannot vary according to the size 
10  Case C-296/95 The Queen v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, ex parte EMU Tabac 
SARL, The Man in Black Ltd, John Cunningham [1998] ECR I-1605 (EMU Tabac). 
11  Council Directive (EEC) 92/12 of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for 
products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such 
products [1992] OJ L76/1, as amended by Council Directive (EEC) 92/108 of 14 December 
1992 [1992] OJ L 390/124.
12  EMU Tabac (n 9) para 28.
13  EMU Tabac (n 9) para 33.
14  EMU Tabac (n 9) para 34.
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of the population of the Member States using the language in ques-
tion.15 
Even though the wording “in principle” which found its way into 
the Court’s decision is puzzling, the quoted lines still reﬂ ect the Court’s 
position that all languages have equal value. This is so, notwithstanding 
whether the State is big or small, or whether or not the language is one of 
the more widely spoken languages. Such a position has been conﬁ rmed 
by subsequent case law of the Court of Justice.16
Thirdly, it does not matter whether some language versions are in 
reality translations. In fact, many legal rules contained in both primary 
and secondary EU law expressed in the languages of the countries that 
joined the EU after the adoption of such rules are translations. However, 
this is legally irrelevant. When interpreting EU law, the Court disregards 
that some versions are translations. This does not give lower value to 
such a language version. 
Thus, for instance, in case C-63/06 Proﬁ sa,17 the Lithuanian Su-
preme Administrative Court noticed that the Lithuanian version of Coun-
cil Directive 92/83/EEC on the harmonisation of the structures of excise 
duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages18 differed from other language 
versions. Lithuanian accession to the EU occurred in 2004, and the Di-
rective at issue had been adopted in 1992. Thus, the Lithuanian version 
was certainly a translation. However, the ECJ did not discard this lan-
guage version on account of its being only a translation. Even though, 
in the end, the meaning attributed to the legal rule at issue differed from 
the meaning as interpreted by the Lithuanian Court in the Lithuanian 
language, this was because the meaning was construed in the light of the 
purpose of the Directive, and not because the Lithuanian language was 
ignored and that other language versions prevailed. 
Finally, as the Court cannot give preference to any one language 
version, it can likewise not assume that the meaning as attributed to the 
majority of language versions is correct. Thus, even if all the languages 
but one point to a certain meaning, the Court does not conclude that 
the meaning streaming from the majority of the language versions is the 
correct one. It can even happen that the meaning as it exists under the 
minority of language versions turns out to be the appropriate meaning of 
15  EMU Tabac (n 9) para 36.
16  See, for instance, Case C-257/00 Nani Givane and Others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2003] ECR I- 345 para 36. 
17  Case C-63/06 UAB Proﬁ sa v Muitin s departamentas prie Lietuvos respublikos ﬁ nans  
ministerijos [2007] ECR I-3239. 
18  Council Directive (EEC) 92/83 of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the struc-
tures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages [1993] OJ L 316/ 21.
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the EU legal rule. This is especially so if other language versions do not 
preclude the meaning attributed to the provision by one language ver-
sion. This, for instance, was the situation in case 100/84 Origin of Fish.19 
Comparing the texts, only the German version of the Regulation at issue 
in this case clearly meant that what was signiﬁ cant for the purpose of de-
termining the origin of goods for customs purposes was that the ﬁ sh had 
been caught in the net, and not that they had been taken from the sea. 
Even though this was the only language version conclusively imposing 
such a meaning, the Court found that this was the ‘correct’ understand-
ing of the given Regulation. However, again the reason why the Court 
concluded thus was not because the German version so suggested, but 
because the Court considered that such meaning was in accordance with 
the purpose of the Customs Regulation at issue.
Even though the meaning attributed to the majority of languages 
does not necessarily have to prevail over the meaning attributed to a 
minority of languages, it will often be the case that the majority mean-
ing will be the one that the Court ﬁ nds ‘correct’. The reason is not that 
this constitutes a majority meaning, but rather because such meaning 
conforms with the purpose of the rule as understood by the Court or with 
the actual intention of the person who drafted the rule and the objective 
which that person wanted to achieve. The Court sometimes justiﬁ es the 
discarding of one or more minority language versions simply by stating 
that ‘one language version of a multilingual text of Community law can-
not alone take precedence over all other versions’.20 
3. The CILFIT case and the obligation to compare all languages 
What follows from the fact that all languages have equal value is 
that in interpreting EU law courts cannot rely on one single version. This 
has indeed been conﬁ rmed by the ECJ on several occasions. Thus, as far 
back as 1969, in the case C-29/69 Stauder,21 the Court stated:
When a single decision is addressed to all the Member States the 
necessity for uniform application and accordingly for uniform inter-
pretation makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in 
isolation but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the 
real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to achieve, in the 
light in particular of the versions in all four languages.22 
19  Case 100/84 Commission v UK [1985] ECR 1169 (Origin of Fish).
20  See Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 
[2001] ECR I-8615 para 47.
21  Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm - Sozialamt [1977] ECR 419.
22  Case 29/69 (n 20) para 3.
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Even if it seems to an interpreter, such as a national court, that the 
version of some legal rule in the language which it usually uses is clear in 
meaning, this is not necessarily so if the provision is assessed in the light 
of other language versions. Thus, in the case C-219/95P Ferriere Nord,23 
the applicant company, which would beneﬁ t from the Italian version of 
Article 81 of the TEC, claimed that ‘[…] other language versions should be 
called in aid only where the meaning of one version of a provision is not 
clear’,24 which, according to the applicant, was not the case. The Court 
replied by saying that one language version could not be considered on 
its own, in isolation of other language versions.25 That, in turn, may be 
understood to mean that if one language version seems clear when read 
in isolation, this might not in fact be so. If other versions indicate a dif-
ferent meaning, this is a signal that the ﬁ rst version might not be as clear 
as was ﬁ rst claimed.  
The question arising is whether this should be read that language 
comparison is required in every instance of interpreting EU law. Some cas-
es decided by the Court, or at least, their wording, seem to suggest so. In 
case 283/81 CILFIT,26 the Court quite persuasively stated the following: 
To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Community legislation 
is drafted in several languages and that the different language ver-
sions are all equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of 
Community law thus involves a comparison of the different language 
versions.27 
One could conclude from this passage that the proper way of con-
struing the meaning of an EU legal provision always involves a compari-
son of different language versions. If this were so, one would expect the 
European Court of Justice itself always to compare different language ver-
sions. This, however, is not so. Whoever follows case law regularly knows 
that different language versions are in most cases not mentioned in the 
Court’s Judgments, or indeed in the Opinions of the Advocates General. 
It is, of course, possible that language comparison was performed, but 
no differences were discovered, and therefore the entire exercise was not 
mentioned in the Judgment/Opinion as reported publicly. However, my 
personal experience acquired during a few shorter stays at the Court did 
not reveal that the Court compares language versions as a default step in 
the process of interpretation. 
23  Case C-219/95P Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission [1997] ECR I-4411.
24  Case C-219/95P (n 22) para 13. 
25  Case C-219/95P (n 22) para 15. 
26  Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Laniﬁ cio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 
3415.
27  Case 283/81 (n 25) para 18. 
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What, then, does the statement in CILFIT mean? Like all other legal 
propositions, the statements of the Court also need interpretation and 
this may differ depending on the interpreter. So, the interpretations of 
what the CILFIT case meant also differ.28 What follows is, therefore, my 
own interpretation. The CILFIT statement might be explained by placing 
the case in its context. It was given in answer to a reference by the Italian 
Corte suprema di Cassazione, the highest court in the judicial hierarchy 
in that country. Article 234 TEC which regulates the preliminary ruling 
procedure creates an obligation for courts against whose decision there 
is no judicial remedy to refer preliminary reference on interpretation to 
the ECJ, if a question of interpretation of Community law is necessary 
for solving a case. In order to avoid references to the ECJ, the highest 
courts in some countries have developed the so-called acte clair doctrine, 
according to which sometimes legal provisions can be so clear that they 
do not require interpretation, but can be simply applied. In such cases, 
it was claimed there was no need to refer. The ECJ wanted, on the one 
hand, to prevent this developing practice of the highest courts and sought 
to make them refer, and on the other, it was aware of the sensitivity of the 
situation and wanted to avoid any conﬂ ict with the highest courts. Thus, 
the Court accepted in principle the acte clair doctrine, but qualiﬁ ed it by 
exposing all the difﬁ culties which stood in the way of the conclusion that 
EU law was clear. Thus, among other things, the Court also warned that 
due to its multilingualism, interpretation of EU law requires a compari-
son of all language versions. This statement must be read in the context 
of the Court’s efforts to persuade the courts of the highest Member States 
to refer, pointing out that linguistic comparison is useful, and that it can 
be more easily performed in the ECJ which has the resources to take all 
languages into consideration. Thus, the statement was not given as a 
rule that language comparisons were always required when interpreting 
EU law.
4. Why and on whose initiative is language comparison performed? 
Language comparison does not happen regularly in the ECJ. Even 
though such a comparison could indeed be useful since it could reveal 
a multiplicity of possible meanings, the efﬁ ciency of judicial process, as 
well as the costs of such language comparison, do not in practice allow 
for such an exercise on every single occasion. An interesting question that 
arises is when, then, is language comparison performed by the ECJ?  
28  For an overview, see F Mancini and DT Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional 
Challenge Facing the European Court’ (1991) 11 YEL 1-13. See also H Rasmussen ‘The 
European Court’s Acte Clair Strategy in CILFIT’ (1984) 9 EL Rev 242-261.
10 Tamara Δapeta: Multilingual Law and Judical Interpretation in the EU
My research revealed that the initiative to undertake language com-
parison comes from the parties to the case, national judges or, some-
times, the Court itself, most usually from its Advocates General. 
It is not surprising that parties to the case use ‘language strategy’ to 
try to win the case. If the meaning attributed to the EU norm in the lan-
guage of the court does not suit a party, one way to shake the established 
meaning is to ﬁ nd divergences in different language versions. Therefore, 
in numerous cases in which language comparison has been undertaken, 
it is clear that the initiative came from one of the parties to the case, or 
from the intervening parties. Sometimes, this can be read from the case, 
as reported.29 Sometimes, it is clear from the reported case that the initia-
tive came from the national court that referred the question.30  However, 
it is not always revealed whether the national court undertook language 
comparison on its own initiative or on the initiative of the parties, the lat-
ter case being more probable. National courts should, according to the 
ECJ, perform language comparison if they interpret EU law themselves. 
It is, therefore, encouraging to realise that there are courts which have 
left behind the worlds as deﬁ ned by only their language, and embraced 
multilingualism. However, of the enumerated cases, the courts that have 
referred to the ECJ with language issues come from a small number of 
Member States - Germany, the Netherlands, UK, and Lithuania.31 
As already mentioned, sometimes the parties or the national court 
do not raise the language issue in the European Court, but comparison 
is undertaken by the Advocate General, and/or the Court.32 It is possible 
that this practice will increase on account of the changes that are taking 
place in the internal functioning of the ECJ. For example, every member of 
the Court has its cabinet, consisting of four legal advisers (référendaires) 
in the case of Advocates General, and three in the case of Judges (in prac-
tice, the post of administrative secretary is often turned into the post of 
29  See, eg, Case C-149/97 The Institute of the Motor Industry v Commissioners of Customs 
and Excise [1998] ECR I-7053; and Case C-36/98 Spain v Council [2001] ECR I-779.  
30  See, eg, Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde Staten 
van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403; Case C-420/98 WN v Staatssecretaris van Financiën 
[2000] ECR I-2847; Case C-63/06 Proﬁ sa (n 16); Case C-300/05 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-
Jonas v ZVK Zuchtvieh-Kontor GmbH [2006] ECR I-11169 (Animal Transport); or Case C-
306/06 Telecom GmbH v Deutsche Telekom AG [2008] ECR I-1923.
31  My research did not cover a large number of cases (only the cases mentioning ‘lan-
guage’ and ‘version’ according to the web search on Eur-lex <www.eur-lex.europa.eu> and 
which were decided in the last few years, together with some older representative cases in 
this ﬁ eld). It is therefore possible that there are other courts in European states that are 
prepared to take into consideration the fact that EU is multilingual. However, this issue 
requires further research.
32  See, eg, Case C-1/02 Privat-Molkerei Borgmann GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Dor-
tmund [2004] ECR I-3219; Case C-251/04 Commission v Greece [2007] ECR I-67; Case 
C-239/07 Julius Sabatauskas, not yet published; Case  C-298/07 Deutsche Internet Ver-
sicherung,  not yet published.
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legal secretary, adding a fourth référendaire to the Judge’s cabinet). It has 
recently become more usual for cabinets to be multinational. The function 
of the legal advisers is to help the Judge or the AG in drafting Judgments 
or Opinions. They, therefore, perform the necessary research. Given that 
their mother tongue is often different from that of the Judge or Advocate 
General, it is likely that they would look up the version of the EU law in 
their own language if the interpretation of certain terms used is at issue. 
This increases the possibility that language differences are discovered. 
The ECJ usually trusts its AGs in terms of the language comparison 
performed,33 but sometimes it conducts its own comparison, possibly in-
cluding more languages,34 sometimes arriving at different conclusion.35 
On the other hand, occasionally important language differences revealed 
by the Advocate General end up completely ignored by the Court.36 
An examination of the case law therefore provides several reasons 
for language comparison to be undertaken by the courts. They may be 
systematised as follows. Firstly, the language comparison might be un-
dertaken when the meaning of the wording in one language is not clear 
at face value. In such situations, other language versions are used as an 
aid in revealing the meaning of the legal norm. Alternatively, it is possible 
that meaning as expressed in one language seems clear, but unless com-
pared to other versions it may no longer seem so certain. The initiative 
for a comparison for such a reason would more probably come from the 
party who is not happy with the meaning of a norm in one language, rath-
er than from the court, either a national or European one. Sometimes, 
however, such an initiative might come from the Court itself. In any case, 
looking into other language versions might shake the apparently clear 
meaning attached to one language version. 
Finally, studying other language versions might also serve the pur-
pose of justifying or proving the correctness of the meaning attributed 
to the norm.37 Of course, the latter purpose would be achieved only if no 
differences are revealed in different language versions.  
33  Eg Case C-173/07 Emirates Airlines - Direktion für Deutschland v Diether Schenkel [2008] 
ECR I-5237 para 25.
34  Eg Case C-420/98 WN v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (n 29).
35  As in Case C-72/95 Kraajieveld (n 29).
36  As in Case C-265/03, Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Fed-
eración Española de Fútbol [2005] ECR I-2579. See in this respect C Hillion, Comment on 
Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Es-
pañola de Fútbol [2005] ECR I-2579 (2008) 48 CML Rev 815, 824.
37  As in Case 19/67 Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v JH van der Vecht [1967] ECR 445; 
Case 19/83 Knud Wendelboe and others v LJ Music ApS, in liquidation [1985] ECR 457; Case C-
251/04 Commission v Greece (n 31); Case C-62/06 Fazenda Pública - Director Geral das Alfân-
degas v ZF Zefeser - Importação e Exportação de Produtos Alimentares Lda [2007] ECR I-11995. 
See also A Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, Oxford 2006) 611. 
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5. How is language comparison undertaken?
The language comparison can end in two outcomes: either all lan-
guage versions mean the same, or they do not. The difﬁ cult question is 
how we can come to either of these two conclusions. The difﬁ culty comes 
from the following: if there is no determinate, literal meaning of language, 
how do we know the meaning in one particular language to be able to 
compare it with the meaning in another language? Or, in other words, 
if a provision in one language can have different meanings, how do we 
conclude that there are differences? 
We have started from the premise that a literal meaning of words 
does not exist, but rather depends on the context and the interpreter. 
This, we believe, is also true in a unilingual legal environment. However, 
it seems that sometimes the Court and its AGs understand language 
comparison to mean looking for the literal meaning, or the usual mean-
ing, of the words used in different languages. Thus, for example, in case 
C-298/07 Deutsche Internet Versicherung,38 Advocate General Colomer 
performed a comparison of the dictionary meanings of a word used in one 
Council Directive, and concluded that the meaning of the English word 
‘details’ or the German ‘Angaben’ is broader than the Spanish ‘señas’ or 
the French ‘coordonnées’.39 AG Cosmas did the same in respect of the 
English term ‘trade-union’, or the French ‘syndicalle’ in case C-149/97 
Institute of the Motor Industry.40 On the other hand, the meaning attrib-
uted to these words by the mentioned Advocates General may also be 
considered subjective, since using a dictionary was their personal choice 
to derive meaning. If someone else were asked about the meaning of the 
same words, that person might come to a different conclusion. The way 
out of this puzzle is to accept that, depending on the interpreter, there 
might be different conclusions about whether or not language versions 
differ.
One already mentioned case can nicely serve to explain that words 
in one language version, taken in isolation from other language versions, 
might have different possible ‘literal’ meanings. In case 100/84 Origin of 
Fish,41 the dispute arose between the UK Government and the Commis-
sion about when ﬁ sh become a product for custom purposes. The English 
language used the term ‘taken from the sea’ and the French ‘extraits de 
la mer’. Arguing the case, the Commission claimed that the literal inter-
pretation of the terms used in English and French was ‘caught in the 
38  Case C-298/07 Deutsche Internet Versicherung (n 31).
39  Point 21 of the AG Opinion in Case C-298/07 (n 31). 
40  Points 33-34 of the AG Opinion in Case C-149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry (n 28).
41  Origin of Fish (n 18).
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net’, as the ﬁ sh were thus ‘separated from the sea where they lived before 
being caught’.42 At the same time, the UK Government claimed that the 
literal meaning of the same terms was ‘raising the nets out of water and 
swinging them on board ship’.43 There were two contrary claims as to the 
‘literal’ meaning of the same wording in the same language. Depending 
on which of these two meanings was accepted by the Court, there would 
be differences, or no differences, from the German wording which, as it 
seems, was conclusively pointing to the meaning suggested by the Com-
mission. 
The Court is aware of these problems. Thus, for example, in case C-
296/95 EMU Tabac,44 the applicants claimed that all language versions, 
except for the Greek and Danish versions, allowed for the goods to be 
bought through an agent for personal use, and still be exempted from 
excise duties. In paragraph 35 of the Judgment, the Court stated the fol-
lowing:  
In that regard it must be observed that the contradiction between 
the Danish and Greek versions on the one hand and the other lan-
guage versions on the other only arises if the argument put forward 
by the applicants in the main proceedings is accepted. 
The argument the Court is referring to in the quoted lines is the in-
terpretation that other language versions allow an agent to be involved. 
The Court is thus aware that discrepancies in different language versions 
might exist in one interpretation, and be absent in another interpreta-
tion. 
However, it is true that most often differences will be found because 
the most common meaning that the majority would attribute to a certain 
word in a certain language differs from the most common meaning the 
majority would attribute to the word in a different language, with the 
same place in the legal provision as the former. 
6. The legal certainty problem 
If we admit that there is such a thing as the common, or the most 
common, meaning of a word as used in a certain language, we must also 
brieﬂ y address the issue of legal certainty. If legal rules contain prescrip-
tions about which behaviour is acceptable and which is not, then often 
people act in a way that they believe is allowed by the legal rules, or in 
such a way, according to their understanding of the legal rules, that leads 
42  Origin of Fish (n 18) para 9.
43  Origin of Fish (n 18) para 11.
44  EMU Tabac (n 9).
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to certain consequences. A problem arises if the common understanding 
of a rule in a certain language differs from what the Court establishes as 
the proper meaning of that rule. In such a case, a person would be pun-
ished for following the legal rules. 
A similar argument of legal certainty was used by the Dutch Govern-
ment in case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld45 in order to uphold the claim that only 
the Dutch version of a Directive was authentic in the Netherlands. Any 
other solution would be contrary to the legal certainty requirement, as 
people in the Netherlands relied on the Dutch version.46 The Court real-
ised the possible problem, but has never properly addressed it. Thus, in 
case 80/76 North Kerry Milk Products Ltd,47 it stated:
The elimination of linguistic discrepancies by way of interpretation 
may in certain circumstances run counter to the concern for legal 
certainty, inasmuch as one or more of the texts involved may have 
to be interpreted in a manner at variance with the natural and usual 
meaning of the words.48 
However, apart from noticing this, the Court did not discuss the 
issue any further (and it has, likewise, not answered the Dutch Govern-
ment’s arguments given in the Kraaaijeveld case). In the North Kerry Milk 
Products case, the Court wrongly, in my opinion, used the fact that reli-
ance on language can cause legal uncertainty to support its claim that 
preference should therefore not be given to any language version. Even 
though this sends the message that meaning is not in the text, it still 
does not address properly the fact that a party relies on a certain mean-
ing given by the words chosen in the text in one language.
The issue of legal certainty that arises in the described situations 
does not differ from the problem of legal uncertainty that exists on ac-
count of the indeterminacy of language, including legal language, in gen-
eral. So, the problem is not conﬁ ned to a multilingual environment, but 
is an issue that should be addressed in relation to legal interpretation as 
a whole, although it is too complex to be addressed in this article. I wish, 
however, to point out one fact that is often neglected in discussions on 
legal uncertainty. In disputes that end up in the courts, there are always 
two parties. Often, these disputes are about the meaning of law. This 
means that in the end one party might end up being punished because 
he or she followed the law as he or she believed it needed to be followed. 
However, the other party understood the law differently. Therefore, legal 
45  Kraaijeveld (n 29).
46  Kraaijeveld (n 29) para 25.
47  Case 80/76 North Kerry Milk Products v Minister for Agriculture [1977] ECR 425.
48  North Kerry Milk Products (n 46) para 11. 
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certainty cannot exist until the case is resolved by the court which has 
the power to give authoritative constructions of its meaning. 
In the EU multilingual context, the problem of legal uncertainty on 
account of the indeterminacy of language might have an additional di-
mension. Namely, it is possible that the two meanings of the same word 
- ‘national’ and ‘EU’ - will differ only in some languages and not in others, 
which will bring some EU citizens into a worse position than others, only 
because of the language they use when reading legal rules. Indirectly, 
this would mean their discrimination on the basis of nationality, which 
is prohibited in the EU. Such an issue has, however, never arisen before 
the ECJ. 
7. What happens if differences are found in language versions? 
If there are differences in language versions, the Court would con-
clude that therefore ‘no legal consequence can be based on the termi-
nology used’.49 The language thus becomes, if not irrelevant, then less 
important in ﬁ nding an adequate meaning of a legal norm. 
The way the Court then looks for the appropriate meaning is by 
referring to the purpose that is to be achieved by the rules at issue. The 
standard formulation by which the Court expresses this is:
The different language versions of a Community text must be given 
a uniform interpretation and hence in the case of divergence be-
tween the versions the provision in question must be interpreted by 
reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it 
forms part.50 
In the case of linguistic differences, the Court determines meaning in 
the light of the purpose not only when EU legislation is at issue, but also 
when an interpretation of the Treaty is required.51 
49  Case 30/77 Régina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999 para 13.
50  Régina v Pierre Bouchereau (n 48) para 14.  This formula was repeated in many cases, 
and it has stayed unchanged up to today (for example, Origin of Fish (n 18) para 17; Case C-
372/88 Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales v Cricket St. Thomas Estate [1990] ECR 
I-1345 para 19; Case C-449/93 Rockfon A/S v Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark [1995] 
ECR I—04291 para 28; Kraajieveld (n 29) para 28; Institute of the Motor Industry (n 28) para 
16; Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommis-
sion Wien and Wein & Co. HandelsgesmbH v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung  [2000] 
ECR I-1157 para 42; Case C-187/07 Criminal proceedings against Dirk Enderdijk [2008] 
ECR I-2115 para 24; Animal Transport (n 29) para 16; Case C-426/05 Tele2 Telecommuni-
cation GmbH v Telekom-Control-Kommission [2008] ECR I- 685 para 25. 
51  Spain v Council (n 28) para 49.
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Of course, what then becomes crucial for the construction of the 
meaning of EU legal rules is how the ECJ ﬁ nds or construes such a 
purpose. As interesting and important as this issue may be, it is not the 
object of this article. Therefore, I will make only a few observations in 
that regard. Sometimes, when legislation is at issue, one way to ﬁ nd the 
purpose is to look into the intention of the legislator, either by consult-
ing the travaux préparatoires, if there are any and if they reveal any such 
intention, or by looking in the Preamble of the legislative act. Sometimes, 
the choice of the proper word was part of the discussions in the legislative 
bodies. In such cases, the legislator’s opinion about the meaning of the 
word used is important for discovering its meaning.52 However, in most 
cases the ECJ will not look into preparatory documents, or try to ﬁ nd the 
intention of the legislator in any other way. This is especially true in rela-
tion to the Treaties. The purpose of a legal rule and of the act in which it 
ﬁ nds its place will, therefore, depend much on the ECJ’s own view of it. 
This conﬁ rms once again that the courts, in this case the ECJ, have an 
important role in the creation of legal rules. 
8. Conclusions - How much does multilingualism matter?
If the Court ﬁ nds that a difference in meaning as expressed in differ-
ent language versions exists, it will then, as explained above, try to un-
derstand what the legal rule stands for by looking into its purpose within 
the more general scheme in which it exists. However, the ECJ uses the 
same method to ﬁ nd the proper meaning of the rules if it analyses only 
a single language version.53 Thus, the purposive or teleological approach 
used in the interpretation of EU law is the dominant way for the ECJ to 
establish legal meaning.54 It is not conﬁ ned to solving situations when 
language versions differ. 
Multilingualism, therefore, does not signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence interpre-
tation at the ECJ. Even if Europe were unilingual, the Court would still 
in the ﬁ rst place be looking for the purpose of the legal rules in order to 
establish their consequences for different parties in legal disputes. The 
choice made by the ECJ in its approach towards legal interpretation is 
a fortunate development for European integration. Claiming that legal 
norms carry predetermined meaning, whether expressed in one or many 
52  Telecom (n 29) para 25.
53  This has been so ever since Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Ondernem-
ing van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1. A ﬁ ne 
example is Case C- 56/90 Commission v United Kingdom (Bathing Water Directive) [1993] 
ECR I-4109. 
54  N Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ [1997] 20 Fordham 
Int’l LJ 656.
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languages, risks transforming law into a closed system, detached from 
reality, and accessible only to specialists - lawyers. This may happen if 
lawyers claim that a literal meaning of words exist, and omit the purpose 
of the legal norms from the formula for understanding them.  
In this light, the fact that Europe is legally multilingual might be a 
European blessing rather than a curse, since it does not allow the con-
clusion to be drawn that there is a predetermined meaning of words in 
legal norms. 
I am also convinced that multilingualism does not make the exercise 
of legal interpretation more difﬁ cult. On the contrary, and as evidenced 
earlier in this article, the same legal rule expressed in other languages 
might be of great help in understanding its intention, and therefore, in 
establishing its meaning. 
It seems to me that linguists have fewer problems accepting the in-
determinacy of words than lawyers do. Consequently, there is much that 
lawyers might learn from research on languages and meaning. In this 
sense, it seems important for more interdisciplinary efforts to be under-
taken in research on legal interpretation.55  
55  Several conferences bringing together lawyers and linguists have been organised re-
cently. The Conference ‘Law and Languages’, for which this paper was prepared, was held 
in Dubrovnik from 18 to 20 September 2008. The 2005 Conference that took place in Italy 
ended up with a useful publication edited by B Pozzo and V Jacometti,  Multilingualism and 
the Harmonisation of European Law (Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn  2006).
